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From its discovery in the early 1990s until this day, the error-related negativity
(ERN) remains the most widely investigated electrophysiological index of cortical error
processing. When researchers began addressing the electrophysiology of subjective error
awareness more than a decade ago, the role of the ERN, alongside the subsequently
occurring error positivity (Pe), was an obvious locus of attention. However, the first two
studies explicitly addressing the role of error-related event-related brain potentials (ERPs)
would already set the tone for what still remains a controversy today: in contrast to the
clear-cut findings that link the amplitude of the Pe to error awareness, the association
between ERN amplitude and error awareness is vastly unclear. An initial study reported
significant differences in ERN amplitude with respect to subjective error awareness,
whereas the second failed to report this result, leading to a myriad of follow-up studies that
seemed to back up or contradict either view. Here, I review those studies that explicitly
dealt with the role of the error-related ERPs in subjective error awareness, and try to
explain the differences in reported effects of error awareness on ERN amplitude. From
the point of view presented here, different findings between studies can be explained
by disparities in experimental design and data analysis, specifically with respect to the
quantification of subjective error awareness. Based on the review of these results, I
will then try to embed the error-related negativity into a widely known model of the
implementation of access consciousness in the brain, the global neuronal workspace
(GNW) model, and speculate as the ERN’s potential role in such a framework. At last, I
will outline future challenges in the investigation of the cortical electrophysiology of error
awareness, and offer some suggestions on how they could potentially be addressed.
Keywords: consciousness, ERN, error awareness, event-related potentials, performance monitoring, cognitive
control
INTRODUCTION: THE ERROR-RELATED NEGATIVITY
In the cognitive neuroscience of error processing, the discovery of
an event-related brain potential (ERP) whose amplitude is dif-
ferent depending on the success or failure of an action was a
groundbreaking step. Before Falkenstein and colleagues published
the first peer-reviewed article about said potential in the human
scalp EEG and termed it “Error Negativity” (Ne; Falkenstein
et al., 1991 alternatively, and somewhat more commonly today
called the “error-related negativity”; ERN, Gehring et al., 1993),
the neuroscientific community was largely ignorant toward error
processing, even though much of the experimental groundwork
had been laid in the 1960s, prominently by Rabbitt and colleagues
(Rabbitt, 1966, 1967). The discovery of this first measurable index
of performance monitoring-related brain activity coincides with
a continuously growing interest in the neuroscience of the more
general area of cognitive control, signified by an exponential
increase of publications in the field.
Since the 1990s, during which most of the studies about the
ERN were published in journals focusing on behavioral rather
than neuroscientific research, the differential properties of the
ERN had been probed in a number of early studies. This early
empirical work culminated in the emergence of (at least) four
main branches of theories of what exactly drives the ERN ampli-
tude: the error detection or “mismatch”-theories (Falkenstein
et al., 1991; Coles et al., 2001) postulate the amount of differ-
ence between an intended and the actually performed action as
the main influence on the amplitude of the ERN, with the lat-
ter represented as early as in the motor efference copy. According
to the reinforcement learning theories of the ERN on the other
hand (Holroyd and Coles, 2002), this comparison is carried out
on the subcortical level of the basal ganglia instead, whereas
the amplitude of the ERN amplitude is influenced by a learning
signal carried forward into the cortical generators of the ERN
by the mesencephalic dopamine system. A third perspective of
ERN functionality is offered by the conflict monitoring accounts
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004), which move away
from the accuracy of the action per se as the main determinant
of ERN amplitude. Instead they postulate the degree of motor
response-conflict, i.e., the arithmetic product of the activation of
the erroneous and correct response tendencies at the time of the
response as the decisive factor in ERN amplitude. A last branch of
theories implicate the perceived probability of the occurrence of
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an error in a given experimental trial as the main determinant of
ERN amplitude on that trial (Brown and Braver, 2005).
On the descriptive level, the ERN has a prominent fronto-
central radial voltage distribution on the scalp and is consequently
mostly quantified at electrode FCz in the extended 10–20 sys-
tem of the EEG. Its neuronal generator has been located to
the medial wall of the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC,
Dehaene et al., 1994; Holroyd et al., 1998; Ullsperger and von
Cramon, 2001; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Van Veen and
Carter, 2002; Debener et al., 2005), the human homologue of the
monkey rostral cingulate zone (RCZ, Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), a
region also referred to as dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC).
It is followed by a complex of positive voltage deflections, com-
monly referred to as the error positivity (Pe, Falkenstein et al.,
2000), which itself consists of at least two distinct components
(late and early Pe, respectively) with partially dissociable features
(Overbeek et al., 2005; Ridderinkhof et al., 2009).
The role of the ERN in subjective error awareness, i.e., the
question of whether or not the ERN is related to humans’ con-
scious awareness of the accuracy of their own action, had not been
studied until 10 years after the initial discovery of the ERN. The
relation between a neuronal correlate of error processing on the
one hand, and the emergence of explicit awareness of one’s own
errors on the other hand is of pressing interest for the cognitive
neurosciences of cognitive control, as the subjective perception
of errors has obvious implications for remedial actions following
errors (e.g., with respect to immediate corrective behaviors, learn-
ing from errors, or other behavioral adaptations, particular such
that are in any sense intentional). Ultimately, one would want
to be able to exploit the neuronal correlates of error processing
for everyday life, e.g., in the context of brain-computer interfaces
that inform a person of whether an error was made or not, which
is why it is very important to identify which neuronal correlates
influence the emergence of the subjective, spontaneous realiza-
tion of having committed an error. The ERN is a prime candidate
for this as it is (a) chronologically the first physiological manifes-
tation of error-related processing following the response, peaking
in the first 50–100ms after an errors, (b) unlike the Pe, for which
there exist many source localization attempts with quite variable
results, it is reliably located to a specific, very circumscribed part
of cortex, and (c) there is a huge body of literature about which
factors influence the ERN per se, making it interesting if and how
these factors are related to subjective error awareness.
The first study that explicitly probed the ERN’s sensitivity
toward the degree of subjectively perceived accuracy was pub-
lished in 2000 (Scheffers and Coles, 2000). It was followed by the
emergence of a complex and ambivalent picture in subsequent
studies of subjective “error awareness,” which either backed up
the general finding of that initial study, which was that the pro-
cesses underlying the ERN influence the subjective certainty of
error perception, or seemingly contradicted it. As a matter of fact,
just a year later, an influential study (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001)
failed to find a difference in ERN amplitude with respect to sub-
jective error awareness. In the following, I will review the first
decade of studies that dealt with the ERN and subjective error
awareness, and try to find underlying factors that might con-
tribute to either view. First, however, I will try to characterize and
define what is meant by “error awareness” in a philosophical and
empirical sense.
AWARENESS AND CONSCIOUSNESS: SOME
DEFINITIONS
In order to be able examine error awareness and its influence on
the brain processes that underlie performancemonitoring (or any
brain process that could potentially be influenced by awareness
and vice versa) one must first define what exactly is meant by
(error) “awareness.”
Consciousness and subjective awareness lie at the core of
the discipline of philosophy of mind. As will be seen later on,
what researchers mostly meant by “awareness” in the context
of subjective error perception is called “access consciousness” in
that branch of philosophy (Block, 2007). Access consciousness is
defined as follows
“A mental state is access conscious when a subject has a certain sort
of access to the content of the state. More precisely, a state is access
conscious if by virtue of having the state, the content of the state
is available for verbal report, for rational inference, and for the
deliberate control of behavior.”
(Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, p. 6)
Access consciousness is characterized as the highest quality of
representation in transitive (object-related) consciousness. The
concept of accessibility, which is at the center of what character-
izes an access conscious state, is in practicemainly operationalized
by reportability, i.e., the availability of the presence of a stimulus
for spontaneous verbalization by the (cognitive) system. Access
consciousness and other types of transitive consciousness can
be distinguished on the basis of the strength and quality of the
subjective representation of a either a stimulus in a system or
an internal state of a system in that system itself (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 | Typology of transitive consciousness, based on different
theoretical accounts from the philosophy of mind (see text for further
details). Right column outlines defining properties of the different types of
consciousness.
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The degree of awareness of the presence of a certain stimulus
is a good example for illustration: a (cognitive) system can be
completely ignorant with respect to the presence of a stimulus,
with no evidence of processing being present at any stage of the
system. In such a case, the stimulus would consequently be clas-
sified as being “unperceived” in the narrow sense; the system
would be non-conscious of it. The minimum of representation
that must be evident in a system to indicate a type of con-
sciousness is what constitutes phenomenological consciousness
(Block, 1995), or phenomenality (Rosenthal, 2002). Quantifying
this representation is called the “hard problem” of consciousness
(Chalmers, 1995), or the problem of “qualia” (i.e., the “redness
of red,” Crick and Koch, 2003), as opposed to the “easy problem”
of consciousness, which is the problem of access consciousness
(“easy” problem presumably because access consciousness is rel-
atively easily quantifiable on the basis of overt behavior/verbal
reporting). A fourth kind of conscious state is called reflex-
ive consciousness by Block (synonyms: monitoring/interospective
consciousness Block, 2001), and is characterized by the pres-
ence of Higher-Order Thoughts (Rosenthal, 2002), i.e., “thoughts
about thoughts.” This ipsoreflexive quality distinguishes reflexive
consciousness from mere phenomenality (or “thick” from “thin”
phenomenality in Rosenthal’s terminology, where thick phenom-
enality is a synonym for what Block calls reflexive consciousness,
and thin phenomenality is phenomenality in Block’s original
sense). Importantly, (thin) phenomenanilty is indistinguish-
able from non-consciousness both empirically and for the
system itself1.
Beyond being able to formulate a clear working definition
of what one is researching on, what is interesting about these
formal and theoretical classifications for empirical performance
monitoring research, is the question of what is potentially exam-
inable using the battery of methods available to psychological
and neuroscientific research. Research in the area of error aware-
ness usually employs behavioral procedures aimed at an oper-
ationalization of access consciousness (in a sense that subjects
are mostly presented with the computerized version of a verbal
report, i.e., the pressing of a button to indicate conscious avail-
ability). However, reflexive consciousness (“gut feelings”) is also
potentially examinable using standard experimental psycholog-
ical methods. The methodological repertoire of research on so
called “meta-cognitive feelings” (Koriat, 2007), i.e., feelings of the
presence of a certain state in absence of the ability to explicitly
fully characterize its nature, can potentially be utilized in error
awareness research as well, e.g., by using wagering procedures
(Persaud et al., 2007, see “Future directions” for more details).
Also, a big virtue of neuroscientific compared to behavioral meth-
ods is that it is theoretically possible to detect the representation
of a stimulus in the absence of any higher-order thought or access
consciousness. For example, stimulus-evoked activity in primary
sensory areas like V1 or the primary auditory cortex might well
be a physiological manifestation of “thin” phenomenality, which
is per definition unexaminable using behavioral methods.
1This begs the question if it is a valid state of what would commonly be
called “consciousness” to begin with, as it appears to be more of a theoretical
construct (Rosenthal, 2002).
For the purposes of this review, unless otherwise declared, I
will talk about access consciousness when referring to (error)
awareness. What distinguishes “consciously perceived/aware
errors” from “non-consciously perceived/unaware errors” is
reportability: is the subject able to report the inaccuracy of its
action or not? Since there is also an ambiguity in the literature
concerning the naming of error types depending on the presence
or absence of access consciousness, I will refer to errors with access
consciousness as “reported errors” (REs) and to errors in the
absence of access consciousness as “non-reported errors” (NREs),
unless otherwise specified.
ERROR AWARENESS AND THE ERN: A CHRONOLOGY
In this paragraph, I will introduce and discuss the studies that
reported findings with respect to the influence of ERN ampli-
tude on subjective error awareness (or vice versa). This paragraph
should give a comprehensive overview that outlines the respective
details and findings of these studies. A summary of these details
can be found in Table 1.
The first study that explicitly addressed the sensitivity of the
ERN amplitude to subjective error awareness was published in
2000 by Scheffers and Coles (2000). The authors presented sub-
jects with a letter version of the classic flanker paradigm (Eriksen
and Eriksen, 1974). After each trial, they prompted subjects to
rate their confidence in their response on a five-point scaling
ranging from “sure correct” to “sure incorrect,” with a neutral
“don’t know” rating in between. They carried out two main
analyses to address the question of the influence of error aware-
ness on the ERN. The first analysis compared ERN amplitudes
between all five confidence ratings, showing that ERN ampli-
tude increased with growing error awareness. This result was
confirmed in a second analysis which focused only on the three
rating bins “don’t know”, “not sure incorrect”, and “sure incor-
rect,” as only eight participants had sufficient error numbers to
warrant inclusion in the full analysis. Even more so: the same
pattern appeared to be true for the negativity on correct trials
that were examined in the full analysis (correct-related negativ-
ity, CRN, Vidal et al., 2000; Roger et al., 2010): the larger the
ERN/CRN, the more the subjects consciously felt that they had
made an error, even on correct trials. It has to be said that the CRN
and ERN represent the activity of the same underlying neuronal
network (Roger et al., 2010), and therefore, ostensibly reflect the
same process.
This seemingly clear cut pattern of results was subsequently
contradicted just 1 year later, though: Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001)
published results from an eye-movement experiment, an anti-
saccade task (AST), which demonstrated a null effect of error
awareness on the ERN. In the anti-saccade paradigm, subjects
must inhibit a prosaccade to a target stimulus appearing on one
side of the screen and initiate an “anti”-saccade to the opposite
site. Similarly (but not identically) to Scheffers and Coles (2000),
Nieuwenhuis and colleagues prompted their subjects to assess the
accuracy of their action after each trial: subjects had a limited time
following the onset of the display of a cross on the correct side
of the screen in order to press a button when they thought they
had committed an erroneous prosaccade to the wrong side of the
screen. Whereas the error positivity was significantly enlarged for
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Table 1 | Details of the studies that report testing of ERN amplitude differences for reported vs. non-reported errors, either as part of their main
hypothesis or as auxiliary analyses.
Study Year Task Awareness N p(RE = NRE) Statistical Additional
signaling test information
Scheffers and
Coles (all)
2000 Flanker task (letter
version)
Five-point scale
ranging from “surely
incorrect” to “surely
correct"
8 0.005 ANOVA
(two-sided)
Scheffers and
Coles (partial)
2000 15 0.002 “Don’t know” to “surely
incorrect”
Nieuwenhuis
et al.
2001 Anti-saccade task Awareness button
(1250ms time)
15 0.28 ANOVA
(two-sided)
Endrass et al. 2005 Oculomotor
stop-signal task
Binary rating (1300ms
time)
20 N.A. ANOVA
(two-sided)
Trials without a rating were
potentially discarded
Endrass et al. 2007 Anti-saccade task Binary rating with an
“unsure” option
(press both buttons)
19 0.55 t-test
(two-sided)
O’Connell et al. 2007 Manual Go-NoGo
Task, visual stimuli
Awareness button on
next trial, abolish Go
response
12 0.872 ANOVA
(two-sided)
Minimum for inclusion: 20
errors of both types
(initial N = 19)
Maier et al. 2008 Flanker task (letter
version) with
additional neutral
stimuli
Awareness button
(1200ms time,
including RT on
primary task)
14 <0.001 ANOVA
(two-sided)
Shalgi et al. 2009 Manual Go-NoGo
Task, auditory
stimuli
Awareness button on
next trial, abolish Go
response
16 0.187 t-test
(two-sided)
Woodman 2010 Visual search with
non-masked and
masked stimuli
N2pc, binary rating 7 <0.01 ANOVA
(two-sided)
Steinhauser and
Yeung
2010 Visual pattern
discrimination
Awareness button
(1000ms time)
16 0.046 t-test
(two-sided)
Hughes and
Yeung
2011 Flanker task (arrow
version) with
additional masked
stimuli
Awareness button
(1000ms time)
8 0.086 t-test
(two-sided)
Minimum for inclusion: 6
errors of both types
(initial N = 20)
Wessel et al.
(Exp. 1)
2011 Anti-saccade task Binary rating 17 0.027 ANOVA,
planned
contrast
Wessel et al.
(Exp. 2)
2011 Anti-saccade task Binary rating (with
post-hoc
“sureness”-
quantification based
on rating times)
17 0.018 ANOVA,
planned
contrast
Hewig et al. 2011 Semi-blind
digit-entering
Three-point scale
ranging from “surely
incorrect” to "surely
correct"
16 0.003 ANOVA,
post-hoc
Dhar et al. 2011 Manual Go-NoGo
Task, visual stimuli
Awareness button
(1500ms time)
14 0.467 t-test
(two-sided)
No significant ERN-CRN
difference for either
error type
ERN source (pCMA) has
RE > NRE effect,
p = 0.004
pCMA, posterior cingulate motor area; p(RE = NRE), probability of the null hypothesis of equal ERN amplitudes between reported and non-reported errors; ANOVA,
analysis of variance.
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reported as compared to non-reported errors, the ERN, contrary
to Scheffers and Coles findings, was not.
Surprisingly, in the 4 years after these two initial studies, there
were no further publications that tried to explain the disparity
between them. Following a 2003 study by Dehaene et al. (2003),
which found conflict-related effects in the dorsal ACC/RCZ, the
neuronal generator of the ERN, only for unmasked conflict-
ing primes as compared to fully masked primes, Mayr (2004)
concluded
“There is some convergence across studies in that awareness
seems crucial [. . .] for indications of ACC-related activity. At the
same time, enough inconsistencies remain to preclude any firm
conclusion in this regard.”
(Mayr, 2004, p. 147, references removed from original text)
Mayr cites Scheffers and Coles (2000) study, alongside Dehaene
et al. (2003) and another fMRI study (Stephan et al., 2002) as evi-
dence for the first part of this statement, whereas Nieuwenhuis
et al. (2001) study serves as reference for the second part.
It took until 2005 until the issue was addressed again, when
Endrass et al. (2005) published data from a third type of
paradigm, a stop-signal task in the oculomotor domain, which
also introduced another slightly different scoring method for
error awareness: similar to Scheffers and Coles (2000), people had
to indicate their perceived response accuracy in both cases (errors
and correct trials), but as in Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001), the rat-
ing was binary (error or correct, as compared to the five-point
scale employed by Scheffers and Coles) and people had only lim-
ited time tomake their assessment. In this stop-signal experiment,
Endrass and colleagues again reported a null-finding with respect
to the ERN and error awareness.
Comparable results were obtained in the two next studies dat-
ing from 2007 (Endrass et al., 2007; O’Connell et al., 2007). The
2007 study by Endrass and colleagues employed a similar AST as
Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001), but the rating procedure was identical
to their previous study (Endrass et al., 2005), with the excep-
tion that this time, the response to the accuracy-prompt was not
under time pressure. O’Connell et al. (2007) combined EEG with
concurrent measurements of autonomic nervous system (ANS)
activity, as measured by the skin-conductance response (SCR).
They also employed a novel paradigm into the study of the effects
of error awareness on the ERN, that has been previously used
in the fMRI domain by Hester et al. (2005) to probe the activ-
ity of the RCZ on reported and non-reported error trials (see
below). They employed a Go-Nogo paradigm with Stroop-like
stimuli (color-words in different ink color, Stroop, 1935) that they
called “error awareness task” (EAT). In the EAT subjects have to
perform a Go-response (button-press) unless one of two NoGo-
situations is encountered: (1) a mismatch between word-ink and
meaning of the word (Stroop NoGo); (2) a repetition of the pre-
vious word (Repeat NoGo). With those two complex rules, one
engaging the psychological processes associated with the Stroop
effect and the other engaging working memory effects similar to a
one-back task, a sufficiently high number of non-reported errors
can be achieved (a methodological problem in all error awareness
studies) to warrant statistical comparison. The rating procedure
to assess subjectively perceived accuracy was also arguably more
complex than in previous paradigms: in case subjects thought
they made an error (i.e., a Go-response in one of the two NoGo-
situations), they had to abolish the Go-Response on the next trial
and press an error-awareness button instead. Both these studies
(Endrass et al., 2007; O’Connell et al., 2007) failed to find an error
awareness effect on ERN amplitude, speaking in favor of the ERN
being unrelated to subjective error awareness, and contradicting
the initial findings of Scheffers and Coles (2000). Also, the find-
ings of O’Connell et al. (2007)2 were later replicated in a slightly
larger sample using auditory cues by Shalgi et al. (2009).
To add to the apparent confusion, however, in the last 4 years,
seven more studies were published which all, to different extents,
apparently backed up the findings of Scheffers and Coles (2000),
reporting differences in ERN amplitude or source level RCZ
activity between reported and non-reported errors. The closest
replication of Scheffers and Coles’ findings with respect to experi-
mental conditions was done by Maier et al. (2008), who also used
a letter version of the flanker task. However, they employed the
rating procedure from Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001), having peo-
ple press an “error awareness button” in case of a reported error.
They found highly significant differences in ERN amplitude with
respect to subjective error awareness.
In 2010, Steinhauser and Yeung (2010) manipulated subjects’
incentives to either signal or not signal an error, effectively intro-
ducing two different response-bias conditions. They could show
that it is primarily the error positivity that represents the input
variables of the decision process that leads to signaling or not sig-
naling an error, but they also found differences between reported
and non-reported errors in the overall ERN in their percep-
tual discrimination task, with ERN amplitude being significantly
increased for reported errors. That same year, Woodman (2010)
published a study that differed from all previous studies to certain
extent. Not only did he introduce a previously unseen paradigm
into the error awareness literature (a visual search paradigm with
masked or non-masked stimuli), but he also introduced a special
quantification of awareness. The main task was to detect the pres-
ence of a stimulus in a visual search array by pressing a button
when it was perceived as present in the array and another when
it was supposedly absent. The stimulus was either masked by
simultaneous-offset mask, or by delay-offset mask, with the lat-
ter reducing overt stimulus detection to chance level, whereas the
simultaneous-offset mask left aware stimulus perception intact.
It could be shown that an ERN was only elicited in the con-
dition in which the mask did not disturb conscious stimulus
perception (simultaneous-offset mask), whereas it was absent in
the delayed-masking, pre-conscious condition. Furthermore, and
most interestingly, an N2pc wave could be seen on target tri-
als in either condition, irrespective of masking condition. The
N2pc is an index of a shift in visuo-spatial attention follow-
ing the presence of target stimuli (Luck and Hillyard, 1994). In
essence, this shows a dissociation between intact target-stimulus
representation (as indexed by the N2pc) and performance moni-
toring (as indexed by the ERN), possibly also dissociating a neural
2O’Connell et al. also reported another null-finding with respect to error
awareness and ERN amplitude in O’Connell et al. (2009), yet the sample in
that study was overlapping with the sample used in O’Connell et al. (2007).
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correlate of classic access conscious “awareness” of an error and
phenomenologically conscious representations of a stimulus (see
above). It also provides evidence that the ERN is related to the
quality of awareness of an error.
The year 2011 brought four more studies that measured ERN
amplitude in error awareness experiments. Hughes and Yeung
(2011) tried to dissociate response-conflict from error aware-
ness using a flanker task with additional masked stimuli. They
reported a null-finding with respect to error awareness and ERN-
amplitude in a limited sample3. They did, however, find an
association between ERN amplitude and error awareness on a
single-trial level, which larger ERN amplitudes being beneficial
for error awareness. In yet another recent study that investigated
concurrent EEG and ANS measurements (heart rate and pupil
diameter) during error awareness, our group (Wessel et al., 2011)
reported a significantly enlarged ERN amplitude for reported
compared to non-reported errors in the anti-saccade experiment,
alongside differential effects of error awareness on both heart-rate
and pupil diameter. In the first experiment, we used a binary rat-
ing for the assessment of error awareness, similarly to Endrass
et al. (2007). In a second experiment, we tried to replicate the
findings using the exact same stimulus layout and timing as in
the first study of error awareness in the AST (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2001). Instead of the awareness button used in their study, how-
ever, we used a twofold procedure to get a more detailed picture
of the degree of error awareness in this experiment. To that end,
we used the same binary rating as in the first experiment, i.e., sub-
jects had to push a button when they thought they made an error
and a different button when they thought they did not. Then,
we subsequently split the experimental trials for each subject and
error type in half, based on the time it took for the subject to
make the assessment of their own accuracy. This was done with
the rationale that ratings that were made very fast were made
with a higher degree of certainty than those which took the sub-
jects longer to make. Not only did we again find a significantly
enlarged ERN for reported compared to non-reported errors, but
we also found that almost all of this difference was explained
by the subsample of aware errors that was signaled very quickly,
i.e., with high certainty, again providing evidence that ERN and
error awareness are directly or indirectly related. Another recent
study backed up this finding (and earlier ones that found an
enlarged ERN for reported errors), this time using another novel
task: Hewig et al. (2011) used a semi-blind digit-entering task
and a three-point rating scale (“correct”, “unsure”, “incorrect”)
after each trial and found significant ERN-CRN differences exclu-
sively for incorrect trials judged “incorrect,” i.e., reported errors.
“Unsure” and “correct”-rated error trials did not differ from their
respective correct counterparts, confirming the results from the
rating-reaction-time split in Experiment 2 in Wessel et al. (2011).
3However, as noted by the authors in the discussion, the low number of
samples hampers the acceptance of a null-finding in this study. This is espe-
cially true since, even despite the low sample size, the significant tendency
(p = 0.086, two-sided) would turn into a positive finding if tested in a one-
sided fashion [which would be justified in principle, in light of the previous
results from flanker studies of error awareness, i.e., Scheffers and Coles (2000)
and Maier et al. (2008)].
To this day, the latest study regarding the cortical electrophysiol-
ogy of error awareness (Dhar et al., 2011) did not explicitly focus
on ERPs, but rather on EEG source imaging. Dhar and colleagues
had subjects perform a visual Go-NoGo task with the option of
pressing an awareness button whenever subjects felt they made an
error. Even though they did not find a significantly enlarged ERN
for reported errors compared to non-reported errors at FCz (in
fact, there was no difference between either error trial and correct
trials at FCz, i.e. no ERN), they did find significant differences in
that direction atmore left-lateralized frontal electrode sites, which
is in line with their left-lateralized source-solution for the ERN in
the left posterior cingulate motor area (lPCMA,MNI coordinates:
x = −5 y = −15 z = 55) and also with the voltage distribution
of the ERN in their study (see Figure 2 in their manuscript).
Consequently, the activity in the lPCMA source was significantly
enlarged on reported errors as compared to non-reported errors
in their study.
As is evident, there is considerable disparity between studies
as to whether error awareness is unrelated to the ERN (or vice
versa) or not. Whereas there are several findings that strongly
point to the fact that the ERN does coincide with higher degrees
of error awareness (Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Maier et al., 2008;
Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010; Woodman, 2010; Dhar et al., 2011;
Hewig et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2011), there are enough null-
findings to shy away from too optimistic inferences (Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2005, 2007; O’Connell et al., 2007;
Shalgi et al., 2009).
STUDIES OF THE ERN IN ERROR AWARENESS:
COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Because of the discrepancies in findings between studies, it is
essential to review the commonalities and differences in these
studies (the details of each study are listed in Table 1), and look
for common patterns that might explain either finding, which I
will do in the following.
FACTORS OF THE TASK: DIFFERENT PARADIGMS, DIFFERENT
FINDINGS?
The paradigms used to investigate error awareness in relation
to the ERN and Pe span many of the central paradigms of
performance monitoring or cognitive control research in gen-
eral. Of the abovementioned 13 studies addressing the topic,
three utilize variants of the classic flanker task (Scheffers and
Coles, 2000; Maier et al., 2008; Hughes and Yeung, 2011), four
use Go-NoGo or stop signal paradigms (Endrass et al., 2005;
O’Connell et al., 2007; Shalgi et al., 2009; Dhar et al., 2011),
and three use the anti-saccade task (AST, Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2001; Endrass et al., 2007; Wessel et al., 2011), which is essen-
tially a combination of a Go-NoGo like paradigm and a forced
choice reaction time task like the flanker task (in that one has
to countermand an automatic response tendency and subse-
quently initiate another response). The three remaining studies
used a visual discrimination task (Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010),
a digit-entering task (Hewig et al., 2011), and a masked visual
search paradigm (Woodman, 2010). One apparent tendency is
that stop-signal/Go-NoGo studies (with the exception of Dhar
et al., 2011) generally tend to yield null-findings, whereas flanker
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FIGURE 2 | Testing the error-correction hypothesis of ERN amplitude in
the AST. Depicted are the combined data from both experiments in Wessel
et al. (2011), limited to the 24 subjects that exhibited enough errors to
warrant statistical comparison. (A) Difference between reported and
non-reported errors in this sample. (B) Difference between corrected and
non-corrected reported errors. (C) Difference between reported errors with
fast corrections and reported errors with slow corrections.
findings yield enlarged ERN amplitudes for reported compared to
non-reported errors. The picture is less clear for the AST: whereas
Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001) and Endrass et al. (2007) demonstrated
null-findings; both experiments inWessel et al. (2011) showed the
error awareness amplitude effect for the ERN. All studies using
other paradigms show significantly enlarged ERN amplitudes on
reported errors.
While there seems to be a pattern in that studies using a
task with a Go-NoGo/stop-signal component tend to yield null-
effects whereas other tasks show enlarged ERN amplitudes for
reported errors, it is hard to find an explanation for this. One
reason might lie in the quantification of error awareness itself,
or in the low ERN amplitudes and general effect sizes in these
paradigms, both of which will be reviewed later on in this sec-
tion. First, I will review two hypotheses concerning primary task
performance (stimulus perception and error correction) that have
recently been put forward as potentially influential in produc-
ing the presence or absence of ERN amplitude effects in error
awareness experiments.
STIMULUS DEGRADATION AS POTENTIAL DETERMINANT OF
ERN AMPLITUDE DIFFERENCES
It has been argued that degraded stimulus perception might
underlie the lower ERN amplitude on non-reported errors
(Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010), based on the fact that some of
the studies that reported null-findings used either masking pro-
cedures (Maier et al., 2008) or degraded the stimulus material
in order to obtain enough non-reported errors to warrant sta-
tistical comparison (Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Steinhauser and
Yeung, 2010). However, more recent studies do demonstrate these
differences in the absence of degraded or masked stimulus mate-
rial (Dhar et al., 2011; Hewig et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2011).
Also, the dissociation between stimulus perception on the neu-
ronal level (as quantified by the N2pc) in suchmasking paradigms
on the one hand and error awareness effects on the ERN on
the other hand (Woodman, 2010) speaks against the fact that
degraded stimulus perception is the only influence that causes
ERN differences between error types in error awareness experi-
ments. “Objective” evidence of neuronal stimulus representation
was identical between error types in that study.
Unless subjective awareness of the stimulus material itself is
a determinant of ERN amplitude, which would be assuming a
direct connection between ERN and (error) awareness, differ-
ences in stimulus representation seem unlikely as the exclusive
determinant of ERN amplitude in error awareness studies.
ERROR CORRECTION: DIFFERENCES BASED ON AWARENESS
AND THEIR POTENTIAL INFLUENCE ON THE ERN
Another explanation for the discrepancies between studies has
been put forward by Steinhauser and Yeung (2010). They
argue that
“Ne/ERN amplitude should be determined primarily by variations
in primary task performance rather than variations in error sig-
naling. [. . .] Thus, the ERN increase for detected errors may not
reflect its direct role in error processing, but might instead be a
by-product of the fact that detected errors tend to occur when
fast guess responses are subsequently corrected (cf. Scheffers and
Coles, 2000), resulting in high levels of conflict. This interpreta-
tion is consistent with evidence from the anti-saccade task that
Ne/ERN amplitude is similar for detected and undetected errors
that are always corrected (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001), although in
some studies this relationship is less clear (Endrass et al., 2007).”
(Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010, p. 15651)
It is in line with the evidence from the error awareness exper-
iments that primary task performance does influence ERN
amplitude [see later section: errors in the global workspace: the
accumulating evidence (AE) account]. However, even though
there is evidence from ERN studies not focusing on error aware-
ness that error correction influences ERN amplitude (Rodriguez-
Fornells et al., 2002), there is evidence that the instruction to
explicitly withhold or carry out error correction tampers with the
expectation of error likelihood, error significance (Fiehler et al.,
2005), or a reduced motor threshold that account for differences
in ERN amplitude found in these studies (Ullsperger and von
Cramon, 2006) and are not directly related to error awareness.
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In addition, behavioral findings across studies contradict
the proposition that the ERN amplitude reflects additional
response-conflict that results from the presence or absence of
a corrective response (it should, however, still be influenced by
“classic” response-conflict at the time of the response, cf. Yeung
et al., 2004; Danielmeier et al., 2009). Steinhauser and Yeungmen-
tion that evidence for the error-correction hypothesis from the
AST in Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001), who found identical error rates
for both types of errors and also identical ERN amplitudes, is
contradicted by the AST results from Endrass et al. (2007). In
the latter study, a dissociation between error correction rate and
ERN amplitude was found: significantly fewer reported errors
than non-reported errors were subsequently corrected, despite
identical ERN amplitudes. This pattern of behavioral results was
confirmed in both AST experiments in Wessel et al. (2011), fur-
ther contradicting the influence of corrective saccades on ERN
amplitudes in error awareness AST studies. Also, the same pattern
of results might also be present inNieuwenhuis et al. (2001) data4,
speaking against the error correction as lone determinant of the
ERN amplitude differences found in error awareness experiments.
Based on significant differences in corrective saccade latency rel-
ative to the response, which is shorter for non-reported errors in
all three studies, it seems that in actuality, non-reported errors
are the ones that are corrected in a quick and automatic fash-
ion. Following a response-conflict based rationale, this pattern
of results would actually lead to the prediction of enlarged ERN
amplitudes for non-reported errors, if the presence or absence
or timing of a potential error correction would be the primary
influence on ERN amplitude.
In addition to these arguments, I will in the following present
empirical evidence against the influence of error correction (both
frequency and speed of correctional saccades) on the ERN ampli-
tude result found in our study (Wessel et al., 2011). Figure 2A
displays a re-analysis of the reported errors from both datasets
used in Wessel et al. (2011, see manuscript for details on the AST
and details on data processing), split by whether they were cor-
rected or not. Only 24 out of 34 participants rendered enough
aware errors in both conditions (corrected and not corrected,
threshold at a minimum of five reported errors in each condi-
tion), but for the present purposes, this sample size is sufficient
to warrant a sufficiently low beta-error probability to enable the
testing of a null hypothesis. As can be seen from Figure 2A, there
4Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001) show a plot of size and speed of the corrective
saccades in their manuscript (Figure 1 therein), depicting corrective saccades
in the latency-ranges from 0 to 1200ms following the response. In the design
of their version of the AST [unlike the AST variants employed in Endrass et al.
(2007) and Wessel et al. (2011)], a white cross was displayed on the correct
side of the screen (opposite of the imperative stimulus) 1000ms after the onset
of the imperative stimulus. Based on RTs of 194ms and 200ms for reported
and non-reported errors, respectively, this means that on average, the white
cross was displayed around the 800ms mark in their corrective-saccades plot,
rendering the saccades following that onset prosaccades to the now-present
target rather than spontaneous, endogenous corrections of the error. Given
that there are visibly more corrective saccades depicted in these latency ranges
in the aware errors, even though there were significantly more non-reported
errors on absolute, this speaks in favor of the fact that also in their study, just
like in Endrass et al. (2007) and Wessel et al. (2011), there might have been
more corrections on non-reported errors than on reported errors.
is no difference in ERN amplitude based on error correction in
reported errors: t(23) = −0.2815, p > 0.7. Also, as can be seen
from Figure 2B, there is no difference between fast and slow cor-
rections in reported errors (median split of correction times):
t(23) = 0.6739, p > 0.5.
MEASURING ERROR AWARENESS: WHAT IS AN “AWARE” ERROR?
As seen above, performance on the primary task itself does not
seem to be able to account for the differences in findings. One
interesting possibility is that themeasurement of awareness/access
consciousness itself could be a decisive factor instead. There are
several different quantifications of access consciousness in studies
examining error awareness and the ERN, presumably all aimed
at the same process. Procedures differs in certain core aspects:
(a) difference in signaling between errors and correct trials, (b)
the scaling of the quantification (binary vs. parametric), (c) the
presence or absence of a neutral option, and (d) the presence or
absence of a time-limit to rate one’s accuracy.
There is an even split between studies using a forced-choice
rating (i.e., a button has to be pressed for both errors and cor-
rects) and an error-signaling only (i.e., a button has to be pressed
for errors only; nothing has to be done on subjectively correct tri-
als). Seven studies use the latter approach, whereas seven other
experiments (counting Experiment 1 and 2 from Wessel et al.,
2011, as two separate experiments) use a forced choice rating.
Amongst the studies using an “awareness button” are all stud-
ies using Go-NoGo paradigms. All studies using the “awareness
button” method naturally set a time-limit for the subjects to
make their decision (ranging from 1000 to 1500ms), whereas all
but one (Endrass et al., 2005) studies using forced-choice rat-
ing give subjects unlimited time to come up with their decision
(the tasks will not commence until a decision for a trial has
been made).
Strikingly, these methods of quantification potentially lead to
different classifications of certain errors in terms of whether they
count as reported/perceived or not. In a forced choice rating situ-
ation, subjects can still fully evaluate their (uncertain) situation
and might still signal the error, or judge it as a “don’t know”
trial, if that category is present. When using an error awareness
button, however, after a certain amount of time, the next trial
will start and the previous trial will be marked as “participant
thought he/she was correct,” i.e., as an non-reported error, even
though there might have been some residual error awareness,
which then effectively contaminates the measurement. A good
demonstration for this fact comes from examining false alarm
rates in the different studies. False alarms in this scenario are
rare events when subjects signal their correct responses as erro-
neous. A direct comparison is possible in the AST experiments:
Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001), who used an awareness button, yielded
a false alarm rate of 1.5%. Experiment 2 in Wessel et al. (2011),
which used the exact same primary stimulus layout and task tim-
ing as Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001), but exchanged the awareness
button rating with a forced choice rating, yielded a false alarm rate
of 9.8%. This demonstrates that the usage of an awareness but-
ton not only potentially contaminates the “non-reported” errors
with errors with residual access consciousness, but it also intro-
duces a response bias toward not signaling an error. This is not
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only so because of the fact that unsure situations, where deciding
to signal an error might take more time than allowed would be
rated as “participant thought he/she was correct,” but also simply
because signaling an error by pushing a button is more effortful
than not signaling an error by doing nothing.
While the usage of an awareness button is probably a subop-
timal procedure, it cannot alone explain the differences between
studies. Not only do two out of the seven studies using forced
choice ratings demonstrate null-findings with respect to ERN
amplitude (Endrass et al., 2005, 2007), but also, significantly
enlarged ERN amplitudes on aware errors can be observed in
three out of the seven studies using the awareness button (four
if counting Hughes and Yeung, 2011). Ultimately, when decid-
ing which quantification of consciousness to choose, one is faced
with the decision of whether (a) one wants to have a set of non-
reported errors that are clear of any sort of residual (potentially
reflexive/interoceptive) conscious representation (in which case a
forced choice rating is the method of choice), or (b) one wants
to have a set of reported errors that include only very “highly”
(access-) conscious errors and in turn risk contaminating the
“unaware” errors with potentially reflexively conscious errors.
However, a solution to this problemmight lie in using a finer scale
than a parametric yes/no rating (which some studies have done,
e.g., Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Hewig et al., 2011). Be aware,
though, that if choosing between a forced choice rating and an
“awareness button” procedure, a forced choice is probably the bet-
ter option, because it does not introduce a response bias toward
signaling or not signaling an error.
Since the method of quantification of an “aware” error cannot
on its own account for the different findings (see above), another
issue has to be taken into consideration, which is the question of
type-2 error probability, i.e., the probability of accepting a null
hypothesis, even though the alternative hypothesis is true.
FACTORS OF ANALYSIS: WHEN IS A NULL-FINDING A NULL FINDING?
The question of type-2 error probability is a classic topic in
introductory statistics, but is often neglected in many studies,
especially in the (cognitive) neurosciences. A high probability of
committing a type-2 error stems from either low-power, low effect
sizes, or a combination of the two. Low power mostly results from
small sample sizes used to test a null hypothesis. This is a com-
mon problem in the neurosciences in particular, because data
acquisition is an expensive, time-consuming procedure, which
oftentimes limits sample sizes of such studies to fewer than 20
samples. The average sample size of the ERN-error awareness
studies reviewed so far is 14.7. The sample size of the six stud-
ies officially demonstrating null effects is 14.1. A lot of studies
do find marked numeric differences in neuronal activity that
would replicate the early findings of Scheffers and Coles (2000),
but fail to find significances presumably because of low sampling
size. I have already mentioned the low sample size in the null-
finding from one study (Hughes and Yeung, 2011) as an example.
Since no major inferences in that study were based on this result,
and the authors outline the limited sample size for that result in
the discussion, it can be used for demonstration without deple-
tion of their main findings. If all subjects involved in that study
(N = 20) would have met the inclusion criterion (which was a
minimum number of six errors in both conditions), the two-sided
p-value would have been 0.06 (vs. 0.086 in the eight included sub-
jects), provided the effect sizes would have remained constant.
Considering the fact that all 12 subjects in that study whowere not
included in the actual test were excluded because they were statis-
tically better at either the primary task (resulting in fewer overall
errors) and/or at consciously detecting their errors (resulting in a
lower ratio of non-reported to reported errors), it is not possible
to justify the acceptance of a null-hypothesis. Similar arguments
can in principle be applied to other studies that find numeri-
cal differences but no significances between error types. This is
not to say that these results are of low value, particularly because
the null-findings in ERN amplitude are oftentimes only remote
points in the respective papers that do not lie at the core of the
hypotheses tested. It doesmean, however, that in case of a very low
sample size, particularly when reporting low p-values for reported
vs. non-reported errors, the acceptance of the null-hypothesis is
not warranted from a statistical point of view.
Support for the low-power hypothesis presented here comes
from the fMRI domain.Missing differential error awareness effects
in the dACC/RCZ (Hester et al., 2005; Klein et al., 2007), the neural
generator of the ERN, is oftentimes cited as supporting evidence
in studies reporting the absence of an effect of error awareness
on ERN amplitude. This is despite findings that demonstrate
that response-conflict, which is also registered in the dACC/RCZ
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004) does not evoke such a
RCZ response when elicited subliminally (Dehaene et al., 2003),
and also despite the finding that consciously rejecting trials with
a high subjective error-likelihood is correlated with activity in the
RCZ (Magno et al., 2006). The three studies that explicitly address
error awareness related activity in the RCZ in fMRI experiments
(Hester et al., 2005, 2009; Klein et al., 2007) are an excellent
illustration of the potential pitfalls of low samples sizes: Klein
et al. (2007) report numerical differences in RCZ BOLD-activity,
with reported errors eliciting more activity than non-reported
errors (visible in Figure 2C in their manuscript), which fails to
reach significance in the 13 subjects reported (p = 0.211, two-
sided), leaving the anterior part of the left insular cortex as
the only part of cortex sensitive to subjective error awareness.
Hester et al. (2005) initially reported null-findings in the error-
awareness task (EAT) with respect to RCZ activity as well, also
in 13 subjects (p = 0.59 for the RCZ ROI). In a later study
(Hester et al., 2009) using the same experiment in 16 subjects,
however, they did find significant differences in that exact region.
All of this is not to argue that there is a definitive effect of
error awareness on the amplitude of the ERN/RCZ activity, and
all studies not demonstrating these effects fail to do so. There
are certainly many factors that contribute to error awareness, and
even more factors that potentially contribute to ERN amplitude.
Error correction and stimulus representation might be among
them, but they are unlikely to account for the differences found
across several error awareness studies. Differences in study design
or operationalization of subjective error awareness (see above)
could account for many differences in findings.
In any case, based on the argument made in this paragraph, it
is not possible to uphold the statement that the amplitude of the
ERN is unrelated to subjective awareness. On the contrary: while
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there are many studies that demonstrate enlarged ERN ampli-
tudes with respect to subjective error awareness with a low
enough type-1 error probability to warrant rejection of the
null-hypothesis (Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Maier et al., 2008;
Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010; Woodman, 2010; Dhar et al., 2011;
Hewig et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2011), there are few, if any, stud-
ies that have sufficiently low type-2 error probability to warrant
an acceptance of that null hypothesis. Future studies should make
sure to contain large enough sample sizes in order to allow for
strong inferences in case of a potential null finding.
A PUTATIVE ROLE OF THE ERN IN AN OVERARCHING
MODEL OF ACCESS CONSCIOUSNESS
After one establishes the fact that the ERN and error aware-
ness are not unrelated, the obvious question is: what is its exact
role in the emergence of error awareness? Does the amplitude
of the ERN influence the emergence of error awareness or vice
versa? Furthermore: what’s the role of the Pe? What’s the role of
the ANS, which has been found to react differently to reported
and non-reported errors (O’Connell et al., 2007; Wessel et al.,
2011)? Ullsperger et al. (2010) have recently proposed a unified
account of a putative role of these potentials in the emergence
of error awareness, in which multiple sources of evidence accu-
mulate over time and eventually culminate in error awareness
(or blindness). Steinhauser and Yeung (2010) have convincingly
demonstrated that this accumulating evidence (AE) is indeed
reflected in the amplitude of the error-related potential following
the ERN, the error positivity. In the following, I will try to link
these accounts with each other and embed them in a prominent
theory of the emergence of access consciousness in the brain, the
global neuronal workspace (GNW) theory (Baars, 1988; Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001).
THE GLOBAL NEURONAL WORKSPACE THEORY
TheGNW theory is a unified theory about the neuralmechanisms
underlying the emergence of access consciousness of any stimulus
in the brain. It is based early formulations of a “global workspace”
of consciousness from Baars (1988) and on Fodor’s distinction
of the brain into different “modular facilities” that are distin-
guishable from an “isotropic system” that integrates information
across these modules (Fodor, 1985). Consequently, Dehaene and
Naccache (2001) and Dehaene and Changeux (2004) pose the
existence of two distinct networks in the human brain: the net-
work of processors on the one hand, and the “global neuronal
workspace” (GNW) on the other.
There are multiple different separate entities that comprise
the network of processors, which consists of modules that code
simple visual information (area V1), motion (area MT), faces
(fusiform face area), or sounds (auditory cortex areas in the
temporal lobe), amongst many others. Although the informa-
tion coded in these processors differs in complexity and level
of abstraction, all these areas have in common that they are
located at relatively early stages of the stimulus processing chain,
and can relay information in a specialized, automated, and fast
feed-forward fashion.
The second network, the GNW, constitutes the neuronal
basis of access consciousness according to the theory. It consists
of long-range excitatory axons, which allow the exchange, or
“broadcasting” of many different kinds of information across the
areas that comprise the network of processors. It is the process
of entering the GNW that effectively constitutes the emergence of
awareness in the GNWmodel.
Attention plays a critical role in the GNW theory. Just as
in classic models of attention, a stimulus can enter the GNW
through one out of two mechanisms: (a) the specific mod-
ule/processor is already the current locus of attention (top-down
allocated attention) or (b) the stimulus is of sufficient strength to
attract top-down attention itself (bottom-up driven attention).
The existence of a GNWhas been formulated over a decade ago
and predictions derived from it have been experimentally tested in
several studies (e.g., Del Cul et al., 2007). It addresses the question
of the generation of access consciousness in a neurobiologically
plausible way, which is why I will try to implement our recent the-
ory about the emergence of error awareness in the human brain
(Ullsperger et al., 2010) into this framework, specifically focusing
on the role of the ERN.
ERRORS IN THE GLOBAL WORKSPACE: THE ACCUMULATING
EVIDENCE ACCOUNT
A putative model of the emergence of error awareness is outlined
in Figure 3. It embeds ideas from the AE account of emerging
error awareness (Ullsperger et al., 2010) into the more general
framework of the GNW model (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
The general idea of the AE model fits in well with the basic
principle of the GNW model: in the AE model, consistent with
experimental findings, evidence about the accuracy of an action is
available frommultiple different cortical processors that code dif-
ferent types of information. This information accumulates over
time and contributes to the reportability of an error in a feed-
forward fashion. This kind of parallel processing in multiple
different areas corresponds to the “network of processors” in the
GNWmodel. Reportability of an error is then defined as access of
that accumulating information to the GNW.
THE NETWORK OF PROCESSORS: CODING OF MULTIPLE
SOURCES OF ERROR-EVIDENCE
Differences between reported and non-reported errors have been
described on multiple levels of early and late nervous system
processing. Much of this information is available at very early
latency ranges, making it chronologically and logically unlikely
to be a consequence of error awareness, and rather implicate it
in feed-forward processing that contributes to emerging error
awareness.
Sensory systems
It has been shown that errors that are subsequently reported dif-
fer from non-reported errors with respect to quantity and quality
of the sensory information at hand. It is evident from correction
rates in the AST studies (Endrass et al., 2007; Wessel et al., 2011,
and potentially alsoNieuwenhuis et al., 2001, see above) that non-
reported errors are more often corrected than reported errors.
This is a somewhat unexpected result, provided one interprets
error correction as an intentional and conscious act. However,
all three AST studies unequivocally report even more prominent
effects of error awareness on correction times, i.e., the time from
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FIGURE 3 | A putative model schematic of emerging error awareness in
the human brain, based on the accumulating evidence account of error
awareness and the global neuronal workspace model. Information about
the accuracy of an action is processed in parallel in different areas that
comprise the “network of processors,” which feeds forward into the GNW.
Note that the flow of information indicated by the arrows is only depicted if
potentially meaningful for error awareness. Additional exchange of
information is also probable (especially attentional modulation from the GNW
to the network of processors). Be aware that the potential functions of the
performance monitoring network outlined here represent the main branches
of theories that have been put forward, and it doesn’t mean that the ERN is a
correlate of all these computations, but probably only a subset of them. ERN,
error-related negativity; BG, basal ganglia; dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex; RCZ, rostral cingulate zone; PES, post-error slowing; DA, dopamine.
the erroneous to a subsequent corrective saccade, showing much
longer correction RTs for aware errors. Thismeans that most non-
reported errors were corrected very fast (or vice versa: most fast
corrected errors were subsequently not reported), potentially in
an automated fashion, making them harder to detect for cogni-
tive systems than the reported errors, which are not only corrected
less frequently, but also with longer latencies. In terms of sensory
representation, this means that for subsequently reported errors,
gaze was directed in the wrong direction for a longer period of
time, resulting in more sensory evidence for the cognitive system
to detect.
Motor systems
On the motor level, another finding from the AST studies
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2007; Wessel et al.,
2011) provides a good demonstration of different levels of error-
evidence between error types: these studies consistently show
larger saccade sizes for reported as compared to non-reported
errors. Hence, there is also quantitatively more evidence for
inaccuracy of an action on aware errors.
Performance monitoring systems
It is far beyond the scope of this review to speculate as to the exact
functional significance of the ERN or its underlying neural gener-
ator, the dACC/RCZ, and its associated network of brain regions.
However, it does not matter for the purposes of this model what
ERN/RCZ activity actually signifies. All four major accounts of
ERN/RCZ function (see introduction) have a common theme in
that this brain region (RCZ) and its respective neurophysiological
signature (ERN) monitor ongoing behavior, potentially with the
function of signaling the need for adjustments (Ridderinkhof
et al., 2004), or even implementing these adjustments itself.
What could be shown based on the review of the existing lit-
erature is that there is a growing amount of evidence that the
levels of ERN/RCZ activity differ between reported and non-
reported errors, with the former carrying quantitatively more
information/activity. So while it is not to be determined what
exact function this module serves (detecting mismatch between
a forward model and the motor efference copy (Falkenstein et al.,
1991; Coles et al., 2001), monitoring response-conflict (Botvinick
et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004), reflecting a learning signal from
the dopaminergic midbrain (Holroyd and Coles, 2002), repre-
senting the likelihood of an error on a given trial (Brown and
Braver, 2005), or signaling the unsigned reward prediction error,
or “surprise” of a given response (Alexander and Brown, 2011;
Hayden et al., 2011), it can be said with certainty that this activity
differs with respect to subjective error awareness.
Interoceptive systems
One of the most interesting modules in this model is the inte-
roceptive system. It has been shown in at least two studies
(O’Connell et al., 2007; Wessel et al., 2011) that the activity of
the ANS differs with respect to subjective error awareness. This
is particularly interesting with respect to the fact that the insu-
lar cortex has been shown to be also sensitive to this factor
(Klein et al., 2007, for a review, see: Ullsperger et al., 2010). The
insular cortex has been conjectured to reflect the activity of an
“interoceptive awareness” system (Critchley et al., 2004; Craig,
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2009; Medford and Critchley, 2010). The question of causality
(or even temporal order) between the ANS, the insular cortex,
and error awareness is not sufficiently clear as of yet. Particularly,
this is because of the fact that necessary lesion studies of the
insular cortex are hard to conduct. Ischemic stroke damage that
is exclusive to the insula, while leaving the prefrontal cogni-
tive controls areas/circuits intact, is very rare given the layout
of the cerebral blood supply. Therefore, it can only be specu-
lated whether the differential autonomic activity, which could be
picked up by the interoceptive system, contributes to the emer-
gence of error awareness, or whether the awareness of the error
leads to an increased activation of the ANS. Nevertheless, it is
theoretically possible that this system is another module coding
information of relevance for the access of erroneous information
to the global neuronal network.
Interaction between different modules
The information coded in these distinct networks is very differ-
ent in nature, but can be potentially used by the cognitive system
in a cumulative fashion, which could then enable the erroneous
quality of an action to exceed a threshold necessary for (access-)
conscious report. It is notable that these networks, although dis-
tinct in nature, also interact with one another in a way that is
relevant to error processing. For example, ERN amplitude/RCZ
activity has been shown to predict the amount of error-related
remedial processes (for a review, see Danielmeier and Ullsperger,
2011). Such processes are evident in both the motor domain (as
indicated by post-error slowing (PES), a relative slowing in reac-
tion times following errors as compared to correct trials), as well
as in sensory cortices (evident in the attenuation of task-irrelevant
information and amplification of task-relevant information fol-
lowing errors). Both these processes have been found to correlate
with preceding activity in the ACC/RCZ (PES: King et al., 2010,
post-error regulation of sensory areas: Danielmeier et al., 2011).
PES has also been found to be predicted by ERN amplitude on the
previous error trial (Debener et al., 2005; Wessel and Ullsperger,
2011). Interestingly, these processes could also be mediated by the
GNW (or any other part of the cognitive system that mediates
error awareness): in studies that examine the relation between
ERN/Pe amplitude and error awareness, PES has been consis-
tently found to be exclusive for aware errors (e.g., Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2007; Wessel et al., 2011), regardless
of whether an ERN effect for error awareness is reported. The
same is true (to a lesser extent) for Klein et al. (2007) fMRI study.
However, it is also possible that the neuronal processes underly-
ing PES happen in the absence of awareness and are triggered by
other factors that coincide with greater error awareness. This is
later conjecture is backed up by findings from behavioral stud-
ies that find PES in the absence of error awareness (Rabbitt, 2002;
Logan and Crump, 2010). The PES—error awareness contingency
might be exclusive to the AST (which is the paradigm that was
used in all studies that report positive findings, see above), where
eye-movements (as opposed to button presses) are the primary
response domain, and which has been used in all four studies
that report greater PES for reported errors. This can potentially
give insights into possible variables that give rise to both error
awareness and PES at the same time, without the two themselves
having a direct, causal connection: in the AST, as seen before,
unreported errors are associated with fewer behavioral evidence
(smaller saccade sizes), sensory evidence (faster corrections, i.e.,
less visual evidence of “having looked in the wrong direction”),
and proprioceptive evidence for the erroneousness of the action.
This lack of evidence compared to reported errors ostensibly ulti-
mately leads to error blindness on these trials. The same might
not necessarily be true for button press paradigms, especially
with respect to proprioceptive feedback: compared to an eye-
movement, an erroneous button press is associated with stronger
proprioceptive feedback, but also with all sorts of other sensory
evidence (the auditory “click” of the key, the visual feedback of
moving the finger), which is the same across both types of errors,
unlike in the AST. These same factors (or a subset of them)
could in fact be the variables causing PES. More research on the
dynamics of the interaction between the different subsystems that
carry error-relevant information is needed in order to answer this
question.
THE QUESTION OF THRESHOLD: ALL-OR-NOTHING ACCESS AND
THE ROLE OF THE Pe
The GNW model postulates access to the GNW as an all-or-
nothing process, potentially signified by biological parameters
with bimodal distributions, such as the P300 ERP (Dehaene and
Changeux, 2004). It has been shown that the P300 does indeed
parallel the non-linear properties of subjects’ reports of seeing or
not seeing amasked stimulus (Del Cul et al., 2007). It has also long
been speculated that the error positivity (Pe) signifies processes
comparable to the stimulus-locked P300 (Overbeek et al., 2005).
Therefore, it is tempting to speculate that the Pe does indeed sig-
nify the activity of the GNW (as the P300 seems to do), and,
therefore, the actual expression of error awareness. However, in
the recent study by Steinhauser and Yeung (2010), the Pe has
been found to be more related to the accumulating stimulus input
into the error-awareness decision process than the output. It is
an interesting question for future research whether the Pe is an
input signal into the GNW, which might represent a combination
of the input from the network of processors, or whether it is an
output signal, reflecting the categorical “all-or-nothing” access to
the GNW. What might potentially help is a distinction between
the two different parts of the Pe, the late and early Pe (Overbeek
et al., 2005; Endrass et al., 2007). The early Pe seems to be largely
correlated with the ERN and might potentially signify the activ-
ity of the same underlying cortical generator, as is suggested
by studies investigating the ERN using independent-component
analysis (ICA, Jutten andHerault, 1991), which qualitatively show
intact Pe effects when restricting the data to the independent-
components underlying the ERN (Debener et al., 2005; Eichele
et al., 2010; Wessel and Ullsperger, 2011). The later parts of the
Pe seem to reflect a different process that is potentially closer to
an actual expression of error awareness (Endrass et al., 2007),
and might, therefore, indeed reflect the process that underlies
the stimulus-locked P300 and potentially reflects access to the
GNW. An early Pe might, therefore, have the properties that
Steinhauser and Yeung (2010) describe, i.e., reflecting the cumu-
lative input of error evidence into the GNW, whereas a later
part of the Pe could indeed have the bimodal distribution that
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would be predicted based on the Pe/p300-equivalency hypothesis
and the findings of Del Cul et al. (2007), and signify the actual
expression of error awareness. This idea could be tested in future
research.
Several predictions from this model, in which the information
coded in the network of processors accumulates and is reflected
in the amplitude of the Pe, are in line with earlier findings: ERN
and Pe amplitude have been found to be significantly correlated
on a single-trial level on multiple occasions (e.g., Steinhauser and
Yeung, 2010; Hughes and Yeung, 2011). Also, the amplitude of the
Pe correlates significantly with skin-conductance changes found
following errors (Hajcak et al., 2003), which in turn has been
found to be sensitive to subjective error awareness (O’Connell
et al., 2007).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There are many different areas in which the field of error aware-
ness research could make headway, which are certainly not all
related to the specific role of the ERN. I will outline three
major strains of research that could significantly contribute to the
advancement of the field of error awareness research. Certainly,
several other ideas come to mind, such as the assessment of
the role of pre-trial states that influence primary task perfor-
mance (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Eichele et al., 2008)
with respect to their role in error awareness. In the follow-
ing, I will focus on three general fields of ideas that are either
closely related to the research reviewed in this article, or can be
directly applied to the research of the role of the ERN in error
awareness.
THE QUANTIFICATION OF (ACCESS) CONSCIOUSNESS
As described above, reportability by means of categorical rating
procedures is the primarily used index of the degree of “error
awareness” on a certain trial.
While this is certainly a valid index of access conscious avail-
ability of the accuracy of an action, one could think of more
“indirect” quantifications of access consciousness. The issue of
reactivity, i.e., interfering with ongoing psychological processes
by probing them explicitly, is not as big an issue for the research
on error awareness as it is for instance for contingency aware-
ness in implicit learning, where probing explicit memory contents
can trigger additional factors that interfere with the processes
of interest (cf. Dienes, 2008). However, it is potentially possi-
ble that explicitly probing error awareness of every trial alters
a generic error monitoring process. Therefore, more indirect
measures could be employed. Persaud et al. (2007) recently
demonstrated that post-decisional wagering procedures effec-
tively capture awareness of contingencies in an Iowa gambling
task. Such measures could be used to get a fine-grain quan-
tification of error awareness as a single-trial measure (e.g., by
allowing for a very unconstrained wagering procedure—“Wage
anywhere between 1 and 100 cents on your accuracy,” or by
having subjects bet on their action outcome in case they report
their behavior as “unsure” or “don’t know”). Correlating these
measures with ongoing neuronal activity should allow for spe-
cific hypothesis testing and should enable researchers to pull
apart the exact mechanics of what really drives the emergence of
error awareness. Also, these measures could allow for the potential
quantification of types of consciousness that are not necessar-
ily captured by overt and explicit rating procedures. Research on
metacognitive feelings such as feeling of knowing (Koriat et al.,
2006; Koriat, 2007) has shown that there are representations
of stimuli/internal states that can be both accurate (i.e., greater
than chance level), but not available for overt report, potentially
getting at what philosophers called “reflexive” or “interocep-
tive” consciousness (Block, 2001). Another interesting approach
that could certainly help elucidating the factors that contribute
to error awareness is the quantification of the neuronal pro-
cesses of stimulus perception from the mechanisms of error
monitoring, as has been done in Woodman (2010). In a philo-
sophical framework, it could be argued that this particular study
could successfully disentangle phenomenological consciousness
of a stimulus from access consciousness of an error. Further
experiments along these lines could also help to elucidate the
exact processes that are necessary for the emergence of error
awareness.
METHODOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS AND SINGLE-TRIAL HYPOTHESES
All studies reviewed in this article have measured the ERN using
the classic averaging method, according to the logic of event-
related potential research. As notable exceptions, Steinhauser and
Yeung (2010) and Hughes and Yeung (2011) have used func-
tional logistic classification methods to generate spatial filters
that dissociate the ERN from other ongoing brain processes in
order to obtain single-trial amplitudes, even though the hypothe-
ses tested were limited to the Pe. Advances in signal processing
methods have given rise to many different approaches that can
be used to study the single trial properties of ERPs like the
ERN. This is particularly important because error awareness stud-
ies of ERP data oftentimes deal with the problem that many
subjects do not have enough unreported errors to warrant a reli-
able average. Increasing the signal to noise ratio to the point
where a single-trial analysis is possible effectively alleviates this
situation.
Independent Component Analysis (ICA, Jutten and Herault,
1991) has been successfully used to study single-trial properties of
error-related brain potentials (Debener et al., 2005; Eichele et al.,
2010; Wessel and Ullsperger, 2011). Many other techniques are
available that yield sufficient single-trial signal-to-noise ratios to
enable single-trial research on the ERN. Such methods could be
used to test hypotheses that are only hardly testable using aver-
aging procedures: does the amplitude of the ERN on a given trial
directly affect the accuracy rating (one would need a continuous
or at least non-binary quantification of both ERN and access con-
sciousness to answer this question), as, e.g., Scheffers and Coles
(2000) results suggest? Is access to the GNW a continuous phe-
nomenon or is it reflected as an all-or-nothing process in the
properties of error-related ERPs? ICA (and other blind source
separation or functional source separation techniques) would also
enable the dissociation of the ERN/early Pe complex and the late
Pe, which could then be used for separate hypothesis testing,
e.g., about the association between the central nervous correlates
of emerging access consciousness and error awareness. Such ques-
tions could be answered by exploiting the single-trial amplitudes
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of error-related ERPs, and could thereby significantly promote
research in this field.
INDIRECT BENCHMARKS: THE FUNCTIONAL ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
IN ERROR PROCESSING
Consciousness, in order for it to be an empirically relevant
process, needs to serve a certain function, or as Koriat put it:
“Self-controlled processes have measurable effects on behavior.
Although [. . .] many cognitive processes, including some that are
subsumed under the rubric of executive function, occur outside of
consciousness, there is also a recognition that the person is not a
mere medium through which information flows.”
(Koriat, 2007, p. 292)
Koch and Tsuchiya (in: Block, 2007) also discuss functional roles
of consciousness, and its effects on overt behavior, and summa-
rize:
“Consciousness and (top-down controlled attention) are distinct
neurobiological processes with distinct functions.”
(Koch and Tsuchiya, in Block, 2007, p. 509)
An example for executive function in the context of error
awareness research that is independent of (access) conscious-
ness is rapid error correction (see above). Yet it has also already
been described that some error-related processes, such as PES,
coincide with subjective error awareness, at least in certain
paradigms (specifically the AST). If it can be proven that there
are indeed behavioral markers in the domain of error process-
ing that are causally dependent on subjective error awareness,
this would not only give researchers another indirect index
for measuring error awareness, but it would also elucidate the
mechanism of the emergence of error awareness itself. PES
is a potential candidate for such an index, but it has to be
systematically examined under which circumstances PES and
access consciousness coincide. Other likely candidates such as
the attenuation of task-irrelevant activity and amplification of
task-relevant activity found following errors (King et al., 2010;
Danielmeier et al., 2011) that potentially are highly dependent
on top-down attention need to be studied in a context of error
awareness, in order to further outline the potential functional
role of error awareness in the adaptive regulation of ongoing
behavior.
CONCLUSION
A decade has passed since the first publication of a study on the
effects of subjective error awareness on the amplitude of arguably
the most prominent index of error-related brain activity, the ERN.
A diverse picture emerged in the dozen studies that have been
published since that first report, with some studies reporting
significantly enlarged ERN amplitudes for reported compared
to non-reported errors, and several other studies reporting null
effects.
Based on the evidence reviewed and evaluated in this article, it
appears safe to conclude that the processes that are reflected in the
ERN and the processes involved in the emergence of error aware-
ness are not separate from each other.Whether these processes are
linked by a third process that influences both the ERN-underlying
process and the emergence of awareness remains to be tested in
future studies, and first and foremost needs a definitive identifi-
cation of the process underlying the ERN. However, it should be
evident from central parts of this review that none of the recently
proposed factors that have been proposed to explain the dif-
ferences in ERN amplitude between reported and non-reported
errors (e.g. error correction, stimulus misrepresentation) can
actually account for these effects.
I propose that the ERN serves as a feed-forward input signal
into the systems responsible for error awareness. Alongside the
input from many other areas in which error-relevant information
is coded, the ultimate emergence of “error awareness” is grounded
on the amplitude of this input. This proposition was expressed in
terms of a combination of the previously existing AE account of
error awareness and a more general model of the mechanisms of
emerging access consciousness in the brain. The exact causal and
chronological relations should be the focus of future study in this
field that combines two of the most exciting areas of research in
cognitive neuroscience: cognitive control and the emergence of
awareness.
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